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A UNITARY APPROACH TO SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS:
THE NEW YORK PROPOSALS*
By GEPALD ABRnl
T HE revolutionary goal of the code reform in civil procedure was the
creation of the completely unitary action: that is, a single form of
procedure for all judicial proceedings. To a great extent this goal has been
attained. Most of the remedies which are available in the courts of a
particular state today may be obtained by following one basic form of
procedure.2
In one very important respect, however, the reformers failed. From
the very beginning, a considerable number of remedies were left entirely
outside the codes. Each of these remedies was permitted to retain its own
peculiar procedure, although there often was a good deal of uncertainty as to
just what that procedure was. They generally were provided for by separate
statutes scattered throughout the substantive laws of the state. The Field
Code denominated all of these remedies which did not follow the traditional
procedure of an action as "special proceedings,"3 but that was the only generic
treatment it gave them.
Why such diversity was allowed to exist in the face of the spirit of
uniformity which brought the codes into being is difficult to say. In any
event, these exceptions to the one form of action principle remained well
established, and through the years the legislatures have created a good many
additional ones. The New York legislature probably has created more
than any other. Provided for in both the Civil Practice Act and the Con-
solidated Laws, these special proceedings range from such ancient remedies
as habeas corpus and quiet title to such less familiar proceedings as destroying
a dangerous dog and compelling a reluctant public officer to turn his books over
to a successor.4 As these special proceedings have multiplied in number and
* This article is adapted in part from materials prepared by the author as a member
of the staff of the New York State Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure. The
views expressed therein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position
of the Advisory Committee.
1. Teaching fellow Harvard Law School.
2. See generally, Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85 (1959).
3. N.Y. Code Proc. § 3, N.Y. Laws, 1848, ch. 379.
4. For examples of the wide scope of these statutory special proceedings, see the
following New York statutes, which represent but a small portion of the special proceedings
now extant in that state: N.Y. Agr. & Mkts. Law § 116 [destruction of dangerous dog-
Matter of Foote, 129 Misc. 2, 221 N.Y. Supp. 302 (1927)]; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 110-a
[removal-Matter of Victor v. Maziroff, 300 N.Y. 686, 91 N.E.2d 586 (1950)], 211-a
[contribution between joint tort feasors-West v. City of N.Y., 276 N.Y. 524, 12 N.E.2d
458 (1937)], 310-312 (depositions for use without the state), 313-321 [perpetuation of
testimony-Matter of Callahan, 262 App. Div. 398, 28 N.Y.S.2d 980, reargument denied,
262 App. Div. 978, 30 N.Y.S.2d 695 (3rd Dep't 1941), motion for leave to appeal ds-
missed, 287 N.Y. 743, 39 N.E.2d 942, appeal and reargument denied, 264 App. Div. 812,
35 N.Y.S.2d 288 (3d Dep't 1942)], 773-811 [proceedings supplementary to judgment-
Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N2..2d 283 (1937)], 977-b [liquidation foreign
corporation-Oliner v. American-Oriental Banking Corp., 282 N.Y. 588, 27 N.E.2d 443
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variety, they have brought with them difficult problems not unlike those
which gave rise to the code reforms.
The proposed revision of civil procedure in New York5 takes the first
(1940)], 1077-b [compel production records in mortgage foreclosure-Matter of East
River Savings Bank, 294 N.Y. 356, 62 N.E.2d 601 (1945), 1283-1306 (proceeding against
a body or officer), 1307-1319 (proceeding relating to express trust), 1320-1324 (proceeding
for settlement of infant's claim), 1330-1335 (proceeding to value interest in real property),
1340 (proceeding to enforce agreement for valuation or appraisal), 1356-1384 (proceeding
for appointment of committee of incompetent), 1384-a-1384-v (proceedings relative to
wards of veteran's bureau), 1385-1406 (proceeding for disposition of real property of
infant or incompetent), 1409-a-1409-i (proceeding for release of claim of infant or in-
competent against state), 1410-1447 (summary proceedings to recover real property),
1448-1469 [arbitration-Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127
N.Y.S.2d 709 (3rd Dep't), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227 (1954)], 1469-a-1469-f
(proceeding for discovery of bondholders); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 60-64 (change of
name); N.Y. Condem. Law [condemnation-Swartz, Inc. v. Utica, 223 App. Div. 506, 228
N.Y. Supp. 660 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 555, 173 N.E. 864 (1928)1; N.Y. Debt. &
Cred. Law §§ 2-24 (general assignment for benefit of creditors-Matter of Lincoln Chair
& Novelty Co., 274 N.Y. 353, 9 N.E.2d 7 (1937)], 120-139 (discharge of judgment debtor
from imprisonment), 150 [discharge of bankrupt from judgment-Guasti v. Miller, 203
N.Y. 259, 99 N.E. 416 (1911)], 250 [payment of debts of incompetent-Matter of Glover,
274 N.Y. 585, 11 N.E.2d 766 (1937)1; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 70 [habeas corpus--Warren
v. Garlipp, 217 App. Div. 55, 216 N.Y. Supp. 466 (4th Dep't 1926)1, 109-118-a [adoption-
Matter of Law, 281 App. Div. 851, 119 N.Y.S.2d 306 (2d Dep't 1953)]; N.Y. Election
Law §§ 330-336 [proceedings to enforce-Matter of Emmet, 150 N.Y. 538, 44 N.E. 1102
(1896)1; N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 25 [election contest-Matter of Orbach v. Kukeby, 3
A.D.2d 269, 161 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1st Dep't 1957)], 40-42 (change of name), 50-53 (transfer
of property), 61-a [assessment of litigation expenses-Matter of Bailey, 291 N.Y. 534, 50
N.E.2d 653 (1943)], 100-119 [voluntary dissolution-Matter of French, 181 App. Div.
719, 168 N.Y. Supp. 988 (1st Dep't 1918)1; N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law §§ 4 [investigation of
expenses of towns and villages-Matter of Town of Hempstead, 32 App. Div. 6, 52 N.Y.
Supp. 618 (2d Dep't 1898)], 50-e(5) [leave to serve late notice of claim-Matter of
Fabricant v. City of N.Y., 298 N.Y. 818, 83 N.E.2d 862 (1949)1; N.Y. Judiciary Law
§§ 90 [admission to and removal from bar-Matter of Mathot, 222 N.Y. 8, 117 N.E. 948
(1917)], 475 [attorney lien-Peri v. N.Y. Central & H.R. R.R. Co., 152 N.Y. 521, 46 N.E.
849 (1897)]; N.Y. Lien Law §§ 19-21-a, 31, 59 [discharge and vacating mechanics lien-
Lehigh Structural Steel Co., Inc. v. Nyack Kennel Club, 283 N.Y. 617, 28 N.E.2d 29
(1940)1; N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 204 (habeas corpus); N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §§
20-28 [leave to sue on bond-Matter of USA., 282 N.Y. 95, 25 N.E.2d 383 (1940)], 80
(delivery of books to successor); N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law §§ 57, 63-g, 74, 87, 89-m, 103, 169
(summary proceeding to enforce order of Public Service Commission); N.Y. Real Prop.
Law §§ 360-366 (quiet title), 370-435 (title registration), 540-563 (foreclosure of mortgage
by advertisement), 570-587 (discover death of life tenant), 590-593 (partition of property
of infant or incompetent); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 700-760 (judicial review of
assessments and equalization determinations), 999 (supplementary proceeding to collect
taxes); N.Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ 10 [inspection of books--Matter of Diamond v. 87
Nassau Street Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 802, 147 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1955)], 21 [valuation
of stock of dissenting stockholder-Matter of Baker v. Central N.Y. Power Corp., 284
N.Y. 1, 29 N.E.2d 241 (1940)].
5. See N.Y. Sen. Introductory No. 26 (1960) (Civil Practice Law); N.Y. Sen. Intro-
ductory No. 27 (1960) (Rules of Civil Procedure); N.Y. Sen. Introductory No. 28 (1960)
(amendments to consolidated laws); N.Y. Sen. Introductory No. 29 (1960) (amendments
to unconsolidated laws) ; N.Y. Sen. Introductory No. 30 (1960) (transfer to unconsolidated
laws). The proposals have been isued with explanatory notes and studies in a series of
four preliminary reports of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure. N.Y.
Leg. Doc. 6(b) (1957) (hereinafter cited as First Report); N.Y. Leg. Doc. 13 (1958)
(hereinafter cited as Second Report); N.Y. Leg. Doc. 17 (1959) (hereinafter cited as
Third Report); N.Y. Leg. Doc. 20 (1960) (hereinafter cited as Fourth Report). The
major portion of these reports has been reprinted in McKinney's Session Law News of
New York, Pamphlet No. 4, pp. A-335 to A-461 (1957); Pamphlet No. 7, pp. A-177 to
A-507 (1958); Pamphlet No. 5, pp. A-171 to A-621 (1959); Pamphlet No. -, pp. A-167-
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steps toward a solution of these problems and toward the creation of a unitary
special proceeding: that is, a single form of procedure for all proceedings
in which a deviation from the standard is justified.6 This proposal represents
a basic change in the present approach toward special proceedings and merits
closer attention in light of the problems which prompted it. The New York
experience is presented as representative of a condition which to a degree
exists nationally.7
I. HiSTORY
In the early stage of development of the common law procedure, each
form of action was a separate proceeding with its own rules.8 As the system
developed, despite the bewildering variety of forms of action, a body of
procedure grew up which was applied in common to most of these forms.9
The dominant philosophy of this procedure was essentially that the parties,
and not the court, had the primary responsibility for carrying the litigation
forward and for determining its scope and content. They were required to do
this in carefully defined formal steps. The judge, to a great extent, was little
more than an umpire whose function it was to see that no misstep was made.10
Whatever the merits of this procedural philosophy," it was hardly
to A-683 (1960). A summary and discussion of the proposals is contained in Weinstein,
Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 50 (1960).
6. The proposals relevant to special proceedings are contained in Third Report 46-48,
154-62, Fourth Report 221, 307-10.
7. See Clark, Code Pleading 87-92 (1928); cf. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 1, 81.
8. Pollack and Maitland, appropriately enough, use a medieval metaphor to describe
the system:
We liken it to an armory. It contains every weapon of medieval warfare from
the two-handed sword to the poniard. The man who has a quarrel with his
neighbor comes thither to choose his weapon. The choice is large; but he must
remember that he will not be able to change weapons in the middle of combat and
also that every weapon has its proper use and may be put to none other. If he
selects a sword, he must observe the rules of swordplay; he must not try to use
his cross-bow as a mace. To drop the metaphor, our plaintiff is not merely chos-
ing a writ, he is chosing an action, and every action has its own rules.
2 Pollack & Maitland, The History of English Law 561-62 (2d ed. 1898).
9. See 2 Pollack & Maitland, op. cit. supra note 8, at 562, n.2.
10. This philosophy is described by Millar as embodied in the principles of "party
prosecution" and "party presentation." It has been present to a certain extent in every
procedural system, but probably more in the common law system than in any other. The
tendency of our modem procedure has been toward more judicial participation in the
litigation. Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, 18 InI. L. Rev. 1 (1923).
For an unfavorable comparison with the Roman system, which was characterized by judi-
cial, rather than party, issue formulation, see Kocourek, The Formula Procedure.of Roman
Law, 8 Va. L. Rev. 337, 434 (1922).
11. Much of our modem procedural reform has been concerned with throwing off
its restraints. The Italian jurist Chiovendu points out that basic to this moder develop-
ment has been the concept that
The justice of the cause does not start with the decision ... there has been
slowly forming the conviction that the judge as organ of the state ought not to
preside passively over the suit, to pronounce at its end the judgment, as the
automatic machine, activated by the weight of the dropping coin, gives forth a
sweetmeat or a ticket of admission: he ought instead' to participate as a living
and active force .... Most problems of procedural law turn upon a fundamental
point-the relation between the initiative of the parties and the initiative of the
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conducive either to speed or flexibility of adjudication. As a result, the
procedure in certain "extraordinary remedies," which by their nature demanded
more summary judicial action, developed independently of this system. The
first of these were the great prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto. 12 By giving the court greater
control of the litigation at an earlier stage, it was found that applications for
such extraordinary relief could be disposed of far more expeditiously.
These extraordinary remedies had certain procedural characteristics in
common. But, in greater part, the procedure of each was essentially unique
and adapted to the needs for which it was created.13 No uniform mode of
summary procedure applicable to a broad class of cases and administered by
the same courts which applied the traditional procedure developed in Anglo-
American law as it did on the continent.14
The technique of providing summary procedure for particular remedies
grew in popularity in our law. As the legislature made more frequent incur-
sions into the judicial field, the number of such remedies rapidly expanded.
By the time of the beginning of code reform in 1848, they outnumbered
the forms of action.' 5
David Dudley Field strongly felt that the greatest evil of the common
law procedural system was its diversity. The countless variations in the
manner of obtaining judicial relief, he maintained, were completely useless
and did much to impede the administration of justice. Uniformity was the
single most important procedural need of the time. Consequently, the goal
of Field's reform was a "uniform course of proceeding in all cases, legal and
equitable."' 6
judge. The forms of proceeding can be more or less rigid, more or less multiplied,
the proceeding itself can be more or less brief, the guarantees greater or less of a
just decision, according as the judge has more or less power.
Chiovenda, Le Riforme Processuali e le Correnti del Pensiero Moderno (1907), quoted in
Millar, Notabilia of American Civil Procedure 1887-1937, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1017, 1068
(1937). But Pollock and Maitland remind us that the common law philosophy of limitedjudicial participation, along with its emphasis on formalism, "the twin-born sister of
liberty," has played a dominant role in the development of "the rule of law" in England.
2 Pollack & Maitland, op. cit. supra note 8, at 563-64.
12. Originally administrative orders by the Crown to its officials, they were developed
by Kings Bench into judicial writs. Their issuance continued a matter of discretion and
did not develop into a matter of course as did the issuance of the original writs initiating
the forms of action. See Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 56, 165 (4th
ed. 1948); Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 Yale 523 (1923).
13. See 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 226-31 (3d ed. 1922). See generally,
High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (3d ed. 1896).
14. For examples of such continental procedure see Engelman-Millar, History of
Continental Civil Procedure 578, 768 (1927); Kaplan, vonMehren, Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1265-68 (1957); McMahon, Summary
Procedure: a Comparative Study, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 573 (1957).
15. See partial listing of only those proceedings referred to in Former Section 390
of the Code. N.Y. Code Proc. § 471, note (Vorhees ed. 1852).
16. Field, What Shall Be Done with the Practice of the Courts? 7 (1847), reprinted
in 1 Speeches, Arguments and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field 226 (Sprague
ed. 1884).
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To a revolutionary degree, Field attained his goal. The forms of action
and the distinction between law and equity were abolished. A single body of
procedural rules applicable to all civil actions was established. A general
term "special proceeding" was given to all judicial remedies employing a
summary procedure, or employing any procedure other than the "ordinary"
one of an action.' 7
But this was as far as the reform went with regard to special proceedings.
Even Field's extraordinary determination and energy were not equal to the
task of completing the reform and bringing uniformity to this confused area.' 8
Thus the 1848 Code did not deal with procedure in special proceedings at all.
It expressly provided that it was not applicable to "any special statutory
remedy not heretofore obtained by action."' 9 Special proceedings were simi-
larly excepted from the operation of the codes adopted in other states 20
Notwithstanding that the ordinary procedure under the code was now a
good deal more simple and expeditious, the "special statutory remedies"
excepted from its operation rapidly grew in numbers and variety. Moreover,
the statutes creating them often contained only sketchy procedural provisions.
Consequently, since neither the code nor common law procedure was applicable
to these new remedies, an ever-expanding procedural vacuum was coming
into being. The Throop Commission,2 ' which undertook in 1870 the first major
revision of the code, recognized this problem. They followed "the general
plan of converting the most important special proceedings into actions, where
that could be conveniently done; and where that course was impracticable,
of applying to them as might be necessary, provisions which now embrace
action only."22
The new Code of Civil Procedure, commonly referred to as the Throop
Code, was finally enacted in 1880.23 Provisions governing many special
proceedings were transferred into the code. In the process, some were changed
17. N.Y. Code Proc. §§ 1-3, N.Y. Laws, 1848, ch. 379.
18. To Hepburn, it appeared in many instances "as if the reformers had grown weary
in well doing, and had left unfinished their task of establishing uniformity in our judicial
procedure." Hepburn, Cases on Code Pleading 83 (1901).
19. N.Y. Code Proc. § 390, N.Y. Laws 1848, ch. 379. The following year the special
proceedings of scire facias, quo warranto and nuisance were converted into actions. N.Y.,
Code Proc. §§ 428, 453, N.Y. Laws 1849. Even Field's completed "Code of Civil Pro-
cedure," of which the 1848 Code was supposed to have been only a part, provided for
procedure in only a few special proceedings and as to these retained the old fragmentary
approach. It was submitted to the legislature in 1850, but was never adopted. See Hep-
burn, The Development of Code Pleading 125 (1897); 3 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 129,
139-140 (1937).
20. But a generic term was not always employed to identify them and the nature of
the proceedings which were chosen for special treatment showed considerable variety. See
Hepburn, Cases on Code Pleading 83 (1901); Clark, Code Pleading 87-92 (1928).
21. So called because of the leadership of Montgomery H. Throop. Appointed as
"Commissioners to Revise the Statutes." N.Y. Laws 1870, ch. 33. See introduction pre-
pared by the commissioners to N.Y. Code Civ. Prac. (Throop ed. 1880).
22. N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 3333, note (Throop ed. 1880).
23. N.Y. Code Civ. Proc., N.Y. Laws 1880, ch. 245. A portion of the code had been
enacted earlier. N.Y. Laws 1876, ch. 449.
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into actions. The non-applicability section of the Field Code24 was eliminated,
and many provisions applicable to actions alone were applied to special
proceedings as well. There was no general provision concerning applicability.
An attempt was made to indicate on a section-by-section basis which provi-
sions of the code applied to special proceedings and which did not. But
for some reason this plan was not consistently carried out, and the applicability
of most sections remained ambiguous.
On the whole, Throop did little to solve the problem. He dealt with
only a small percentage of the special proceedings then extant. The many
outside the code which were left untouched continued to be added to by the
legislature. By 1912, Dean Fiero in a two volume treatise described in
detail the procedure in over fifty of the "more important" special proceedings
and enumerated at least a hundred more.25 Amendments, which brought the
Throop Code at its height to over 3,400 sections, often were made in apparent
unawareness of the necessity of indicating applicability to special proceedings.
When the next major code revision was attempted by the Board of
Statutory Consolidation, under the leadership of Judge Adolph Rodenbeck,
the situation was far more complex than ever before. In 1915 the Board
brought forth a short civil practice act and a simple set of modern rules of
court.
28
Like Field, Rodenbeck was firmly convinced of the importance of
uniformity as a leading principle of modern procedure.27  To accomplish it,
he made a proposal with respect to special proceedings which was as radical
as Field's had been with respect to the forms of action: abolish all special
proceedings. 28
"It is as confusing," the Board found, "to have several kinds of proceed-
ings each adapted to a particular form of relief as it was under the common
law practice to have so many forms of action from which the practitioner
was bound at his peril to make a selection for his particular case." 2 From
this Rodenbeck concluded, "There should be but one form of action and no
24. N.Y. Code Proc. § 390, N.Y. Laws, 1848, ch. 379.
25. 1 Fiero, Special Proceedings (3d ed. 1912).
26. See 1 Report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation (1915). A revised version
is reported in 5 id. (1919).
27. See Rodenbeck, Principles of a Modem Procedure, 4 Va. L. Reg. (n.s.) 821
(1919) ; Rodenbeck, The New Practice in New York, 1 Cornell L.Q. 63 (1916) ; Rodenbeck,
The Reform of the Procedure on the Courts of the State of New York, 34 N.Y.B.A. Rep.
354, 411-14 (1911).
28. See Rodenbeck, Principles of a Modem Procedure, supra note 27, at 824. He
spared only those proceedings, such as habeas corpus, which were required by the con-
stitution. The civil practice act and rules actually proposed, however, were less daring.
Undoubtedly because of the enormous task which a revision of the consolidated laws
entailed, only the special proceedings contained in the code were abolished. Section 4 of
the proposed civil practice act excepted from the "one form of action" requirement "pro-
ceedings otherwise specially regulated by other statutes which shall be called 'special
proceedings.'" 1 Report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation 17 (1915); see id. at 7,
17, 168.
29. Id. at 168.
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special proceedings except where the constitution requires it. Substantive
statutes should not be cluttered up with special remedial provisions. There
should be but one form of procedure for the enforcement of all substantive
rights, with such modifications to meet idiosyncracies of special cases as may
be found necessary."' 30
Although striving for uniformity, Rodenbeck recognized the need for a
summary form of procedure in certain cases. This need was met within the
framework of the action. A summons, similar to a notice of motion returnable
on a date certain, was provided for, to be used where specifically authorized.31
The Rodenbeck proposals were more advanced than any which had been
made up to that time. Had they been adopted, New York again would have
regained its position of leadership in procedural reform which Field had won
nearly seventy years before. The proposals went in to a joint legislative
committee, however, and never came out. The Committee brought forth its
own bill in 1919 which was enacted in the following year as the present
Civil Practice Act.32 It retained the approach of the Throop Code toward
special proceedings. A few were transferred to the consolidated laws,38 and
the applicability of some of the practice provisions was clarified.
Basically, however, the problems of a highly diversified procedure in
special proceedings were left unsolved. In 1937 the Judicial Council recog-
nized this need3 4 and recommended a major change of approach in the very
significant area occupied by the prerogative writs.3 5 As the need for adminis-
trative review grew, these writs were rapidly increasing in importance.
As a result, the legislature added Article 78 to the Civil Practice Act.3 6
That statute abolished the writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
and substituted a uniform procedure, having characteristics of both a motion
and an action, to be employed in all proceedings against a body or officer.
30. Rodenbeck, Principles of a Modem Procedure, supra note 27, at 824.
31. See 1 Report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation 60-61, 271-72 (1915);
Gross, New York's Proposed Simplified Practice Act, 25 Yale 24 (1916).
32. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, N.Y. Laws 1920, ch. 925. See generally Report of thejoint Legislative Committee on the Simplification of Civil Practice, N.Y. Leg. Doc. 111
(1919).
33. Id. at 27, 31, 34-35.
34. The Council found that "In the field of special proceedings, as distinguished from
actions, undue emphasis is still placed upon the form of the remedy. A great variety of
special proceedings exists, each being regarded as distinct and separate from the others,
and having its own pleading and practice provisions, although some of the provisions are
the same in all the proceedings. The litigant is, as a result, compelled to select the
particular proceeding which is regarded by the courts as adapted to the relief which
he seeks. He cannot merely state in his pleadings the material facts on which he relies
and demand the relief to which he deems himself entitled as he could do in an action.
He must put the proper label on his papers and must adhere to the forms with which
that label is associated. Similarly the courts themselves have often been slaves to the
theories which have developed about the nature of the various proceedings." 3 N.Y. Jud.
Council Rep. 133 (1937).
35. See 3 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 129-198 (1937).
36. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1283-1306. See proposed revision of Article 78 in Second
Report 394-405; Fourth Report 354-356.
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Important as this step toward a unitary special proceeding has been, it rep-
resents only a beginning. The problems with respect to special proceedings
which troubled Field, Throop, Rodenbeck and the Judicial Council are the
same ones which we face today, except that they have been intensified by the
continued proliferation of special proceedings.
II. DEFINITION
One of the most perplexing problems in connection with special pro-
ceedings has been the threshhold one of definition. This includes both the
task of retrospectively identifying an application for relief as an action, a
special proceeding or a motion, and the task of prospectively determining
which of these modes of procedure may be employed. The problem is not
merely an academic one. Important consequences may hinge on what label is
attached to the proceeding. But the surprisingly large number of cases which
have been concerned with this problem have resulted in little clarification
of general principles.
The Field Code attempted a basiz statutory definition.3 7 Throop, al-
though conceding that "This definition has often been severely criticized,
and in truth leaves the distinction between an action and a special proceeding
very shadowy," 38 decided to retain it practically intact.39 The draftsmen
of the Civil Practice Act followed suit, and consequently we have the same
statutory definition today.40
Both the Civil Practice Act and the General Construction Law define
an action as "an ordinary prosecution in a court of justice by a party
against another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress
or prevention of a wrong or the punishment of a public offense." 41 A special
proceeding is defined by the Civil Practice Act as 'every other prosecution
by a party for either of the purposes specified" with respect to an action;
42
while the General Construction Law provides "Every prosecution by a party
against another in a court of justice which is not an action is a special
proceeding." 43
The sole basis of distinction between an action and a special proceeding,
therefore, is found in the single word "ordinary" used in defining an action.
Actions are ordinary prosecutions; special proceedings are not. Soon after
37. N.Y. Code Proc. § 1-3, N.Y. Laws 1848, ch. 379.
38. N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 3333, note (Throop ed. 1880).
39. See N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 3333, 3334 (Throop ed. 1880). Field was rather
piqued at the minor changes, e.g., "proceeding" to "prosecution," which Throop did make
in the definition. See Field, The Latest Edition of the New York Code 16-17 (1878)
(letter to Brainerd and others generally denouncing Throop's work).
40. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 4,5; see also N.Y. General Construction Law §§ 11-a,
46-a.
41. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 4; N.Y. General Construction Law 11-a. (Italics supplied.)
42. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 5.
43. N.Y. General Construction Law § 46-a.
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the Field Code was enacted, the courts completed the circle of this definition
by making it clear that "ordinary" prosecutions are those which employ
the traditional procedure of an action.44 That is to say, a proceeding which
is commenced by service of a summons, which progresses by the pleadings
of the parties, and which terminates in a judgment is an action; one which
is commenced, progresses or terminates in some other manner is a special
proceeding.45
Under this test, it usually is not too difficult a task for the practitioner
to look back and determine whether the procedure which he has been using
in a case is that of an action or a special proceeding. Such retrospective
identification can be important. An appeal to the court of appeals from the
appellate division, for example, must be taken directly from the order of
the appellate division in a special proceeding; but in an' action it is first
necessary to enter a judgment in the trial court on the order of the appellate
division.46
Even in looking backward, however, the practitioner must be wary of
pitfalls. Thus, there are independent judicial proceedings which fit into the
definitions of neither actions nor special proceedings and consequently fall
into a procedural no man's land where there is no Civil Practice Act and no
right of appeal.47 Typical of such proceedings are those which are not prose-
44. See Belknap v. Waters, 11 N.Y. 477 (1854); Hyatt v. Seely, 11 N.Y. 52 (1854);
People ex rel. Bendon v. The County Judge of Rensselaer, 13 How. Pr. 398 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1852).
45. See Matter of Klein, 309 N.Y. 474, 481, 131 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1956); Roe v.
Boyle, 81 N.Y. 305 (1880); Matter of Burge, 203 Misc. 677, 118 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct.
1952), rev'd on other grounds, 282 App. Div. 219, 122 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1st Dep't 1953),
aff'd, 306 N.Y. 811, 118 N.E.2d 822 (1954); 3 Fiero, Particular Actions and Proceedings
3095-96 (4th ed. 1922); cf. Matter of Jetter, 78 N.Y. 601 (1879); Marvin v. Marvin, 78
N.Y. 541 (1879); Matter of Callahan, 262 App. Div. 398, 28 N.Y.S.2d 980, reargument
denied, 262 App. Div. 978, 30 N.Y.S.2d 695 (3d Dep't 1941), motion for leave to appeal
dismissed, 287 N.Y. 743, 39 N.E.2d 942, appeal and reargument denied, 264 App. Div. 812,
35 N.Y.S.2d 288 (3d Dep't 1942); McLean v. Jephson, 26 Abb. N. Cas, 40, 13 N.Y. Supp.
834 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
46. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 591; see generally Cohen and Karger, The Powers of the
New York Court of Appeals 94-124 (1952); cf. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 621.
47. See, e.g., Matter of Klein, 309 N.Y. 474, 131 N.E.2d 888 (1956) (out-of-state
proceeding for the investigation of a municipality); Matter of Hirsch, 287 N.Y. 785, 40
N.E.2d 649 (1942) (ex parte motion by incompetent's committee for appointment of special
guardian to bring action); Matter of Droege, 197 N.Y. 44, 90 N.E. 342 (1909) (pro-
ceeding by bar association for removal of city magistrate); Matter of Jones, 181 N.Y.
389, 74 N.E. 226 (1905) (motion by county board to set aside presentment of grand jury
against it); Matter of Sauberman, 267 App. Div. 192, 45 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1st Dep't 1943)
(motion to discharge record of conditional sales contract) ; Matter of Murtagh, 117 App.
Div. 302, 102 N.Y. Supp. 176 (3d Dep't 1907) (motion for commitment of insane person);
Grimmer v. Warren, Moore & Co., 123 Misc. 737, 206 N.Y. Supp. 63 (Sup. Ct. 1924)
(motion for extension of lien). Non-judicial proceedings, of course, are in this category.
See Matter of Luoma, 282 App. Div. 612, 126 N.Y.S.2d 543 (3d Dep't 1953) .(workmen's
compensation proceeding); People ex rel Watt v. Zucca, 160 App. Div. 578, 145 N.Y. Supp.
754 (1st Dep't 1914) (proceeding before board of assessors). But a motion to a court for
the enforcement of a subpoena issued in connection with a nonjudicial proceeding com-
mences a special proceeding. See Matter of Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Brown, 296 N.Y.
549, 68 N.E.2d 861 (1946).
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cuted either "by a party" 48 or "against another party"40 as required by the
definition. Another trap for the unwary is that a special proceeding may at a
certain stage take on the character of an action, or an action may suddenly
change into a special proceeding.r0
What causes the greatest difficulty of all in these cases of retrospective
identification, however, is that an application for relief, which apparently is a
motion within an action, may quite unexpectedly turn out to have been
a separate special proceeding. This confusion is possible because the procedure
employed in a special proceeding and a motion often is indistinguishable.
Both are applications to a court for relief. A special proceeding may be com-
menced by a notice, a hearing had and relief granted by an order of the
court in exactly the same manner as on a motion. Frequently, the only dis-
tinction is a theoretical one. That is, a motion supposedly is made "in" an
action or special proceeding,51 while a special proceeding is "independent"
thereof.52 The rationale which the courts use in making the distinction often
is difficult to perceive.
48. See, e.g., Matter of Droege, supra note 47, where the Court of Appeals expressly
dismissed an appeal in a proceeding by the bar association for removal of a city magistrate
on the ground that it was not prosecuted by a party. But cf. Matter of Mathot, 222
N.Y. 8, 117 N.E. 948 (1917) (disbarment proceeding, also by the bar association).
49. The requirement is not expressly stated in Section 5 of the Civil Practice Act, but
is included in Section 46-a of the General Construction Laws which was enacted at the
same time. This indicates the intent of the legislature, although the General Construction
Law does not purport to effect the Civil Practice Act. See General Construction Law §
101. Despite some talk to the effect that all legal proceedings are either actions or special
proceedings (cf. Keeffe v. Third National Bank of Syracuse, 177 N.Y. 305, 69 N.E. 593(1904)), the courts have generally held that ex parte proceedings are neither actions nor
special proceedings. See, e.g., Matter of Hirsch, 287 N.Y. 785, 40 N.E. 649 (1942) (dis-
missing an appeal from an exparte order because it "does not finally determine a special
proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution"); cf. Matter of Klein, 309 N.Y. 474,
131 N.E.2d 888 (1956); Cohen and Karger, op. cit. supra note 46, at 147; but cf. Matter
of Cooper, 2Z N.Y. 67, 86 (1860) (application for admission to the bar) ; Cohen and Karger,
op. cit. supra note 46, at 103.
50. The danger is described by Abbott in his note to McLean v. Jephson:
The ordinary proceedings in an action sometimes branch out into a special pro-
ceeding, and in pursuing that branch the practitioner must not forget that he has
crossed the line of demarcation. On the other hand there are a number of special
proceedings which at one stage or another are, so to speak, transmuted into ac-
tions, or subjected to the regulations applicable to actions, by reason of special
provisions of statutes which, with the innocent intention of simplifying the
practice, declare, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, that a special
proceeding shall be from such a point, or in such a respect subject to the pro-
visions regulating actions.
26 Abb. N. Cas. 40, 44, 13 N.Y. Supp. 834 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
51. The Civil Practice Act defines an "order" as a "direction of a court or judge,
made in an action or special proceeding" (Section 127), and a "motion" as an "application
for an order" (Section 113).
52. See Matter of Callahan, 262 App. Div. 398, 28 N.Y.S.2d 980, reargument denied,
262 App. Div. 978, 30 N.Y.S.2d 695 (3d Dep't 1941), motion for leave to appeal dis-
missed, 287 N.Y. 743, 39 N.E.2d 942, appeal and reargument denied, 264 App. Div. 812,
35 N.Y.S.2d 288 (3d Dep't 1942); Matter of Burge, 203 Misc. 677, 118 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup.
Ct. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 282 App. Div. 219, 122 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1st Dep't 1953),
aff'd 306 N.Y. 811, 118 N.E.2d 822 (1954); Matter of Lima and Honeoye Falls Railway
Co., 68 Hun 252, 22 N.Y. Supp. 967 (Sup. Ct. 1893); 3 Fiero, op. cit. supra note 45, at
3096.
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Particularly troublesome problems and a great deal of litigation have
arisen in connection with appeals. An order is appealable as of right to the
Court of Appeals only if it "finally determines" a special proceeding.53 The
right of appeal thus may turn on whether a particular application for relief
is denominated a motion, which results in an "intermediate" order, or a
separate special proceeding, which results in a "final" order. 4 Concerned
primarily with policy considerations relevant to appealibility, the Court of
Appeals has made decisions as to what constitutes a special proceeding which
are not readily reconciled with standards applied elsewhere.
Thus, under the third party finality principle, a motion which substan-
tially affects the rights of a non-party is held to institute a separate special
proceeding, although the identical motion as to a party would be considered
merely another motion "in" the action.55 A similar principle has been applied
to designate as special proceedings motions affecting parties in capacities
different from those in which they had thus far conducted the litigation.56
On the other hand, applications for provisional remedies are held to be
motions in an action, although the action has not yet begun and although
they involve non-parties.57
A problem entirely different from retrospectively determining what
53. N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 7; see N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 588; see generally Cohen and
Karger, op. cit. supra note 46, at 35-124.
54. See generally Cohen and Karger, op. cit. supra note 46, at 125-206.
55. See, e.g., Geary v. Geary, 272 N.Y. 390, 6 N.E.2d 67 (1936) (motion by receiver
in separation action for an order directing defendant's employer, not a party, to pay de-
fendant's pension to receiver); Geller v. Flamont Realty Corp., 260 N.Y. 346, 183 N.E.
520 (1932) (motion to hold non-parties in contempt for violation of order that they turn
money over to receiver); Peri v. N.Y. Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 152 N.Y.
521, 46 N.E. 849 (1897) (motion by attorney of plaintiff to vacate satisfaction of judg-
ment for plaintiff to the extent of attorney's lien); Belknap v. Waters, 11 N.Y. 477 (1854)
(motion by non-party creditor to set aside judgment by confession); see generally Cohen
and Karger, op. cit. supra note 46, at 181-206.
56. See, e.g., Matter of Bailey, 291 N.Y. 534, 50 N.E.2d 653 (1943) (motion by
directors of corporation to assess against corporation expenses of a successful defense of
a stockholder' action); Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transportation Co., 261 N.Y. 159,
184 N.E. 744 (1933) (motion by one defendant in a negligence action against another
defendant for contribution as a joint tort-feasor); Moore v. Vulcanite Portland Cement
Co., 220 N.Y. 320, 115 N.E. 719 (1917) (motion by one defendant to charge another de-
fendant with costs because in interest with plaintiff) ; see Cohen and Karger, op. cit. supra
note 46, at 140-41.
57. See Oestreicher v. Oestreicher, 289 N.Y. 759, 46 N.E.2d 360 (1942) (arrest);
Matter of Burge, 203 Misc. 677, 118 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. 1952), rev'd on other grounds,
282 App. Div. 219, 122 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1st Dep't 1953), aff'd 306 N.Y. 811, 118 N.E.2d 822
(1954) (receiver); Morris Plain Industrial Bank v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 640, 64 N.E.2d
710 (1945) (attachment, motion by non-party): Cohen and Karger, op. cit. supra note
46, at 155-57, 204. For status of a motion to take testimony before an action has begun
compare Matter of Attorney General, 155 N.Y. 441, 50 N.E. 57 (1898) (motion to vacate
supoena issued by attorney general in aid of anticipated action held motion in action),
with Matter of Callahan, 262 App. Div. 398, 28 N.Y.S.2d 980, reargument denied, 262
App. Div. 978, 30 N.Y.S.2d 695 (3d Dep't 1941), motion for leave to appeal dismissed,
287 N.Y. 743, 39 N.E.2d 942, appeal and reargument denied, 264 App. Div. 812, 35
N.Y.S.2d 288 (3d Dep't 1942) (motion before action to perpetuate testimony under N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act. §§ 313-321 held special proceeding); cf. Mapley v. Board of Education,
13 Misc. 2d 88, 175 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (application before action to amend notice
of claim is motion in action).
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procedure has been followed is presented to the practitioner who must decide
prospectively what procedure he will be permitted to employ. The problem
is an important one for the practitioner chooses the form of proceeding at
his peril. Like the common law litigant, if he chooses wrong his proceeding
will be dismissed.5 8 In this situation the statutory definition is of little use.
The problem is one of finding authorization for a special proceeding. Without
such authorization a departure from the ordinary mode of obtaining relief
will not be permitted; and if authorization exists, departure generally will be
required.59 As a rule, the authority is provided by a statute.5 0
A few special proceedings are provided for in the Civil Practice Act. But
the great bulk are authorized in otherwise substantive statutes scattered
throughout the Consolidated Laws.61 They are not indexed as special pro-
ceedings and no enumeration is in existence. It is thus a formidable task
in itself for the practitioner to become aware that there is a special statute
pertaining to the particular relief which he seeks. Moreover, once the statute
is found, it will rarely specify in so many words that the relief may be obtained
by special proceeding. Procedure may be spelled out which differs enough
from that of an action to justify the conclusion that a special proceeding
has been created. But, like as not, the statute simply will authorize an
application to a court for relief. Nothing further about procedure is said,
doubtless because the drafters of the legislation did not have the question
of the form of the proceeding which they were creating in mind at all.
One court remarked, shortly after the enactment of the Field Code,
that the statutory definition of a special proceeding was "not remarkable for
. . . perspicuity or distinction. 62  After more than a century of judicial
attempts to sharpen it, the perspicuity and distinction of the definition
are, if anything, even less remarkable. It is only fair to ask, however, to what
extent the indistinctness of definition is inherent in the nature of the concept
being defined. After all, under the present practice in New York and most
58. See, e.g., Matter of Syracuse Trust Co., 158 Misc. 713, 286 N.Y. Supp. 950
(Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 857, 286 N.Y. Supp. 953 (4th Dep't 1936) (motion
by trustee for settlement of account should be action); Matter of Bruns, 156 Misc. 873,
282 N.Y. Supp. 617 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (petition to compel trustee to invade principal should
be action); Matter of Federman, 149 Misc. 4, 267 N.Y. Supp. 126 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (affi-
davit to reform trust deed should be action); Matter of Empire Trust Co., 123 Misc. 673,
206 N.Y. Supp. 136 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (motion by trustee for settlement of account should
be by action); 3 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 129, 133, 144-60 (1937). The problem in trust
cases was alleviated in 1943 by the creation of a new special proceeding. N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act §§ 1307-1319. See 9 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 305-314 (1943); 14 N.Y. Jud. Council
Rep. 55-56 (1948) ; Fourth Report 357-359.
59. See cases cited in note 58 supra; cf. People v. American Loan and Trust Co.,
150 N.Y. 117, 44 N.E. 949 (1896); Matter of Loss, 144 App. Div. 832, 129 N.Y. Supp.
425 (3d Dep't 1911).
60. See Matter of Coss, supra note 52; Matter of Federman, 149 Misc. 4, 267 N.Y.
Supp. 126 (Sup. Ct. 1933); but cf. Matter of Hardy, 216 N.Y. 132, 110 N.E. 257 (1915).
Of course the third party finality cases are an exception to this rule. See notes 55, 56, supra.
61. For examples, see note 4 supra.
62. People ex rel. Bendon v. The County Judge of Rensselaer, 13 How. Pr. 398, 400
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854).
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other states, there is no one type of proceeding which may be defined as a
special proceeding. The difficulty in definition lies not so much in the wording
of such statutes as Sections 4 and 5 of the Civil Practice Act, as in the
fragmentary approach which legislatures historically have taken toward spe-
cial proceedings.
III. PROCEDURE IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING
Once the practitioner has decided that the proper mode of applying to a
court for relief is by special proceeding, he is faced with the problem of
determining what procedure he may use. As in the problems surrounding
definition, his major difficulty lies in the fact that the term "special proceeding"
does not identify a single type of procedure. In this sense, the special proceed-
ing is about at the stage of development of the action in the middle ages,
when "one could say next to nothing about actions in general, while one could
discourse at great length about the mode in which an action of this or that
sort was to be pursued and defended."163
From the statutory definition of a special proceeding, we know only that
its procedure is not "ordinary." In just what respects it is extraordinary
must be determined independently with regard to each special proceeding. The
basic source of information is the statute authorizing the special proceeding.
Then, the Civil Practice Act must be examined in order to determine which
of its provisions apply. Finally, when both these sources fail, the practitioner
is relegated to such rules as may have developed by decision or by local
practice.
A. Special Statutes
Statutes authorizing special proceedings generally contain some provision
for procedure. A few set out a detailed procedural scheme, as for example do
the sections of the Civil Practice Act governing proceedings against a body or
officer 64 and summary proceedings to recover real property.6 5 But the great
bulk of such statutes contain very little procedural detail. Moreover, the
actual content of such procedure as is provided for may vary considerably
from statute to statute. Some of this variation is required by differences in
the remedies to which the procedure is adapted. Basically, however, the lack
of conformity appears to result from the failure of the legislature to treat
the problem as a generic one. Procedure for a .new special proceeding often
seems to be drafted in complete isolation from all that has gone before.
Despite the absence of uniformity, however, it is possible to make a few
generalizations as to some of the common characteristics of the procedure
contained in these special statutes. At the outset it may be observed that
much of the procedure closely resembles that on a motion.66 Thus, the pro-
63. Pollack & Maitland, op. cit. note 8 supra, at 562.
64. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1283-1306.
65. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1410-1447.
66. Some statutes expressly provide that procedure "shall be the same as upon a
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ceeding is frequently commenced by service of notice,67 similar to a notice
of motion, which informs the adversary that certain relief will be applied for
at a certain time and place. The notice requires an actual appearance on the
return date, not merely a responsive pleading. A short notice time, such as
eight days, is generally provided for.
The relief requested and the facts upon which the relief is based are set
forth in what is often termed a petition.68 Ordinarily served with the notice,
the petition usually is related more closely to an affidavit used in support of a
motion than it is to a complaint.69 Its function is most often more of an
evidentiary than an issue-framing one.70 Aside from references to the final
order in which the court grants or denies relief, most statutes contain very
little post-petition procedure. In respect to such matters as enforcement
and appeal, the function and effect of an order terminating a special proceeding
is more analagous to the judgment in an action than it is to an order on a
motion.71
B. Applicability of the Civil Practice Act
Even the most detailed of the statutes leave huge gaps in the procedure
of the special proceeding for which they provide. May the practitioner
turn to the general practice provisions to fill in these gaps? Under the Field
Code he could not. Under the Civil Practice Act it is possible that he may,
but this depends upon which practice provisions he is attempting to apply.
Applicability of the Civil Practice Act must be determined on a section by
section basis.72
Whether a particular section of the Civil Practice Act applies to special
proceedings sometimes may be determined by its wording.73 An express
reference to special proceedings, for example, would indicate applicability.74
In other instances, although the section itself is silent or refers only to an
motion in an action." See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1469e (proceeding for discovery of
names of bondholders).
67. Service is in the same manner as a summons. N.Y.R. Civ. Prac. 21. Unless the
court authorizes another manner in an order to show cause. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 1289.
68. See Shaft v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. 67 N.Y. 544 (1876).
69. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 7(3), 119 (providing that a petition and affidavit
may be used interchangeably); Gould v. Gould, 108 Misc. 42, 178 N.Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct.
1919), aff'd, 203 App. Div. 807, 197 N.Y. Supp. 515 (1st Dep't 1922); but see Matter of
Levine v. Lending, 176 Misc. 462, 26 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
70. But cf. Meyer v. New York Hospital, 7 A.D.2d 60, 180 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1st Dep't
1958), appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d 1021, 185 N.Y.S.2d 547 (holding the petition and answer
in a special proceeding to strict pleading standards).
71. See Matter of Eiss v. Summers, 205 App. Div. 691, 199 N.Y. Supp. 544 (4th
Dep't), appeal dismissed, 236 N.Y. 638, 142 N.E. 316 (1923).
72. For a detailed analysis of applicability of the Civil Practice Act to special
proceedings, see Third Report 659-68.
73. A table has been prepared classifying each section of the Civil Practice Act
according to whether it expressly refers only to actions, only to special proceedings, to
both actions and special proceedings or to neither. It also notes other references, such as
to a judgment or summons, which might aid in the determination of applicability, and all
provisions expressly dealing with applicability. See Third Report 673-95.
74. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 82 (reference to special proceeding added by
amendment).
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action, there may be a provision elsewhere in the act expressly applying it to
special proceedings. Section 308, for example, provides that depositions
may be taken in a special proceeding "as though the proceeding were an
action." 75 But even such apparently unambiguous language is not free from
doubt. Some lower courts, for instance, have refused to allow depositions to
be taken in certain "summary special proceedings" such as habeas corpus
and summary proceedings to recover real property.76
Despite talk in some cases to the contrary,77 the failure of a section
to contain such specific wording is not a definite indication of non-applicability.
Most sections are silent in this respect. Yet many of them have been applied
to special proceedings. Apparently much depends upon the subject matter
of the particular section and its relation to other provisions of the act.
Thus provisions such as those governing the jurisdiction and powers of
courts and judges,78 appear to be of such a general nature as to be applicable
to all judicial proceedings. On the other hand, the provisions setting forth
the rules of pleading,79 the avoidance of which is a chief raison d'etre of the
special proceeding, are applicable only to actions.80 It may be significant that
75. See also N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 10 which applies the statute of limitations to both
actions and special proceedings, providing that the "word 'action' contained in this article
is to be construed, when it is necessary to do so as including a special proceeding .. ."
This provision removed the doubt which existed under the Field Code as to whether there
was a statute of limitations for special proceedings at all. See People ex rel. Olmstead
v. The Board of Supervisors of the County of Westchester, 12 Barb. 446 (N.Y. Sup. CL
1852). But with respect to certain portions of the statute of limitations, this provision
apparently is not clear enough. Thus in a 4 to 3 decision the Court of Appeals held that
Section 44 (twenty year presumption of satisfaction of a "judgment") was not applicable
to a final order in a special proceeding, because "judgment" is a word of art applying only
to an action. Hornblower v. Weeks & Sherwood, 307 N.Y. 204, 120 N.E.2d 790 (1954).
76. Compare Dubowsky v. Goldsmith, 202 App. Div. 818, 195 N.Y. Supp. 67 (2d
Dep't 1922), Wiener v. Regent Brand Clothes, Inc., 204 Misc. 231, 122 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1953), and Application of Heller, 183 Misc. 630, 52 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 268 App. Div. 976, 52 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1st Dep't 1944), with 42 West 15th Street v.
Friedman, 208 Misc. 123, 143 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1955), and People ex rel.
Glasier v. Glasier, 1 Misc.2d 650, 148 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 2 A.D.2d 289,
153 N.Y.S.2d 788 (3d Dep't 1956); see Weinstein and Bergerman, New York Procedures
to Obtain Information on Civil Litigation, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1066, 1084-85 (1957).
77. "Wherever the Legislature intended provisions of the Civil Practice Act to be
applicable to special proceedings as well as to actions it made express provisions to that
effect." Matter of Field's Trust, 193 Misc. 781, 782, 84 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
modified, 276 App. Div. 835, 93 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1st Dep't 1949), modified, 302 N.Y. 262,
97 N.E.2d 896 (1951). .
78. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 62-81.
79. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 241-283.
80. See Matter of Vanderbilt's Trust, 279 App. Div. 587, 107 N.Y.S.2d 39 (2d Dep't
1951), motion for leave to appeal denied, 279 App. Div. 666, 108 N.Y.2d 981, motion for
leave to appeal denied, 303 N.Y. 1016 (1952) (no cross claim permitted in special proceed-
ing); Matter of Field's Trust, 193 Misc. 781, 782, 84 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
modified, 276 App. Div. 835, 93 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1st Dep't 1949), modified, 302 N.Y. 262,
97 N.E.2d 896 (1951) (same); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Shapiro, 163 Misc. 76,
296 N.Y. Supp. 1004 (1st Dep't 1937) (no counterclaim permitted in a special proceeding);
but cf. Clark v. Newton, 140 Misc. 570, 250 N.Y. Supp. 745 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1931) (sum-
mary proceeding to recover real property is an "action" within the meaning of the pro-
vision for bills of particulars). Pleading provisions have been applied by analogy in those
special proceedings most closely resembling an action. See People ex rel. Buffalo Burial
Park Ass'n v. Stilwell, 190 N.Y. 284, 290, 83 N.E. 56, 58 (1907); Matter of Levine v.
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a section, which is itself silent, is closely related to another section which
expressly applies to special proceedings.81
As a rule, sections which refer only to actions, in absence of some other
related provision, have been restricted in their applicability accordingly. 82
But even such sections have been applied to special proceedings where the
nature of their subject matter warranted it.83
The only general conclusion that can be made with respect to applica-
bility of the Civil Practice Act to special proceedings is that neither the
legislature nor the courts have followed a consistent policy. It is true that
in many instances the legislature has taken pains to spell out applicability,
sometimes even enacting amendments for that very purpose. But it is safe
to say that those who drafted the greater number of sections did not consider
the problem of applicability at all.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES
The proposed changes in the present approach of the Civil Practice Act
toward special proceedings84 were designed as an immediate' response to the
problems outlined above. But they are also intended to serve as a foundation
upon which the special proceeding may be built into a uniform broadly available
procedural device. The ultimate goal is a unitary special proceeding to exist
side-by-side with today's unitary action.
To accomplish this, it is proposed that the definition and the applicability
of the Civil Practice Act be changed and that a uniform mode of summary
procedure be established for all special proceedings insofar as they are not
otherwise provided for. Also proposed is a complete survey of the Consolidated
Laws with the object of compiling an enumeration of special proceedings, of
reducing to a minimum the deviation of their procedure from that of an
action, and where deviation is necesary, of conforming it to the new uniform
procedure for special proceedings. 5
Lending, 176 Misc. 462, 26 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. St. 1941). Sometimes special statutes pre-
scribe the use of pleadings "as in an action." See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1291,
1292, 1425.
81. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 99 which refers only to an action, but is a gen-
eral limitation on the power of the court, granted in section 98, to extend time in "an
action or special proceeding." Cf. Grand Central Theatre, Inc. v. Motion Picture Machine
Operators Union, 69 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 263 App. Div. 989, 34 N.Y.S.2d
400 (1st Dep't 1942).
82. See, e.g., Granville v. Giatzer, 281 App. Div. 514, 120 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1st Dep't
1953) (body execution); Matter of Holle, 160 App. Div. 369, 145 N.Y. Supp. 388 (3d
Dep't 1914) (injunction); Edaviel Corp. v. Boykin, 205 Misc. 622, 129 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1954) (third party practice); Matter of Reese v. Chappelle, 206 Misc. 887, 135
N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (request to admit) ; cases cited in note 73 supra; cf. Queens
County Water Co. v. O'Brien, 131 App. Div. 91, 115 N.Y. Supp. 495 (2d Dep't 1909).
83. See, e.g., Matter of Petroleum Research Fund, 3 A.D.2d 1, 157 N.Y.S.2d 693(1st Dep't 1956) (intervention); Catrakis v. Jaris, 280 App. Div. 414, 114 N.Y.S.2d 225(1st Dep't 1952) (real party in interest); Stephen Estate Inc. v. Kaplan, 198 Misc. 948,
100 N.Y.S.2d 455 (N.Y.C. Munic. Cy. 1950) (joinder).
84. See generally Third Report, 46-48, 154-62; Fourth Report 221, 307-10.
85. The Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure has been unable to ac-
complish a complete survey. But some changes in the Consolidated Laws along these lines
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A. Definition
As has been pointed out, the basic difficulties of definition, whether they
are connected with retrospective or with prospective identification of proce-
dure, really cannot be solved by a single provision of statute. These diffi-
culties must be met by more far-reaching changes for which a statutory
definition can only serve as a starting point.
The proposed Civil Practice Law defines as "civil judicial proceedings"
all prosecutions of an "independent application to the court for relief."86
This would include both actions and special proceedings, as well as those no-
man's-land proceedings which now are aassified as neither. All such civil
judicial proceedings would be required to be "prosecuted in the form of an
action, except where prosecution in the form of a special proceeding is
authorized. 87 But applications for relief brought in the wrong form would
no longer be dismissed; instead, the court would "make whatever order is
required for its proper prosecution."88 It is hoped that eventually an enumera-
tion of all the various statutory authorizations for special proceedings will be
added to this definition.89
B. Applicability of the General Practice Provisions
The proposed Civil Practice Law provides that "[e]xcept where otherwise
required by statute or rule, procedure in special proceedings shall be the
same as in actions" 90 and that wherever the word "action" is used in the
proposed practice it shall include a special proceeding.91 This represents
a basic change in approach.
The proposal substantially would eliminate the often difficult problem
are included in the proposals. See generally, N.Y. Sen. Introductory No. 28 (1960); sum-
marized in Fourth Report 631-683. In addition, the committee proposes that most special
proceedings now provided for in the Civil Practice Act be transferred to appropriate Con-
solidated Laws. See generally, N.Y. Sen. Introductory No. 28 (1960); summarized in
Fourth Report 427-630. For example, Civil Practice Act provisions governing the fol-
lowing special proceedings are recommended to be transferred: valuing interest in real
property (1330-1335, to Real Property Law); appointment of committee of incompetent(1356-1384, to Mental Hygiene Law) ; relative to wards of veterans bureau (1384-a-1384-v,
to Military Law); disposition of real property of infant or incompetent (1385-1406, to
Real Property Law); release of condemnation claim of infant or incompetent (1409-a-
1409-i, to Condemnation Law); summary proceeding to recover real property (1410-1447,
to Real Property Law); discovery of bondholders (1469-a-1469-f, to Personal Property
Law). Although in several instances revision seems indicated, transfer is recommended
without major change. But in most instances transferred provisions have been con-
formed to the proposed practice.
86. Section 1.4(b) Fourth Report 221.
87. Section 1.2(b) Third Report 46.
88. Section 1.2(c) Third Report 47.
89. Several states and the federal system have attempted partial enumerations. See,
e.g., Fed. R. Civ. Prac. 81; 13 Del. Code Ann., Super. Ct. (CN.) R. 81; Ill. Ann. Stat.,
C. 110 § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1956). A similar proposal has been made in Virginia. See Den-
man, Analysis of Summary Proceedings Under Special Statutes in Virginia, 1 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 58 (1957).
90. Section 1.2(b) Third Report 46.
91. Section 1.4(j) Fourth Report 221.
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under the present act of determining which general practice provisions apply
to special proceedings and which do not. It also serves to insure against
the procedural vacuum that so often arises under the Civil Practice Act when
it is determined that its provisions do not apply to special proceedings.
Unless some statute or rule can be found which specifically restricts applica-
bility or provides for a different procedure, all of the proposed practice pro-
visions would be applicable to special proceedings as well as to actions. 92
The change of approach is part of a general attempt throughout the
proposed law and rules to achieve uniformity of procedure as far as possible.
The need for a more summary remedy in certain cases has not been ignored.
But unnecessary differences in procedure between actions and special pro-
ceedings, where the difference originates in the Civil Practice Act, have been
eliminated. Thus procedure of special proceedings in such matters as appeals,
costs and enforcement of orders, which in the past has given rise to so much
needless litigation, has been conformed to that of an action. 93
Underlying the proposals is the assumption that procedure should not
vary from the norm unless a conscious policy decision has been made that
the advantages of such a variance outweigh the disadvantages of the resulting
loss of simplicity and uniformity. Such a decision for a variance should be
expressed by a statute or rule in a form which is easily accessible to the
practitioner. The proposed changes in themselves cannot accomplish this
ideal. What is most sorely needed to bring it about is a complete overhauling
of all the separate statutes now governing special proceedings. Unnecessary
procedural variations should be excised and those special proceedings which
do not deserve to be kept should be eliminated altogether. 94
C. A Uniform Procedure for Special Proceedings
While much of the deviation of the procedure in special proceedings
from that of an action is unnecessary and should be eliminated, some of it
serves a very useful function. It meets needs with respect to certain remedies
which cannot be met with the traditional procedure of the action. In broad
terms, the need is for a more expeditious disposition of the application for
relief and for greater control by the court of such disposition. The basic
technique employed by almost all special proceedings is to place the case
in the hands of the court at an early stage in the litigation, by what is
essentially motion practice, and then to permit the court more or less
summarily to dispose of it.
92. A number of states have made similar provisions. See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§ 1109; Idaho Code Ann. § 7-402 (1947); Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 110 § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1956);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(1) (1953) ; NJD. Rev. Code § 32-3205 (1943). See also Fed. R.
Civ. Prac. 1, 81.
93. See Second Report 114-19, 317, 322; Third Report 162, 223-26, 717-25; Fourth
Report 396-401.
94. In 1935 Illinois enacted more than ninety separate statutes in order to accomplish
such conformity. See Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 110 § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1956), and note thereto;
Gottlieb, Proposed Revision of Special Acts to Conform with Civil Practice Act, 23 I11.
Bar J. 147 (1935).
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In view of the basic objectives and techniques which even the diverse
special proceedings of the present practice have in common, a major change
in approach toward the special proceeding is proposed. For the present
fragmentary treatment, the proposed practice would substitute a unitary
view of the special proceeding as a single form of proceeding with a single
mode of procedure. The change would be made effective by the establishment
of a body of rules setting forth the manner in which the procedure of all special
proceedings could deviate from that of the action,9 5 subject to whatever
provisions are contained in statutes governing particular proceedings. 96
The new uniform procedure is contained in Title 27 of the proposed
Rules of Civil Procedure.97 It is really new only in the unitary approach which
it takes. The procedure itself is familiar. In its essentials, it corresponds to
that now used in most special proceedings. In its details, it represents an effort
to meet the needs both of those special proceedings which require a full-scale
trial and those in which relief is granted or denied almost immediately upon
application. It also has been necessary to make the procedure adaptable
to the peculiarities of the many diverse remedies which may be obtained by
special proceeding.
Since every deviation from the procedure of an action results not only
in interference with overall procedural uniformity, but also in a sacrifice
of the benefits of the particular rule departed from, the procedural detail
provided for by Title 27 has been kept to a minimum. Only eleven rules are
proposed. The object has been to conform the procedure of a special pro-
ceeding to that of an action as much as is consistent with the requirements of
speed and flexibility. In many instances, the choice of whether to provide
for deviation has been a difficult one and may admit of some disagreement.
Perhaps the major difference provided for is that a special proceeding is
commenced by service of a notice of petition rather than a summons. 98 The
notice fixes a date for hearing,99 not less than eight days after service,100 at
which respondent must appear. It is not, as is the summons, merely a notice
to plead. Because of the necessity of obtaining original jurisdiction, the
notice is served in the same manner as a summons. 10 ' As is proposed with
respect to the complaint in an action,' 0 2 the petition must be served with the
notice.1
0 3
95. See Third Report 154-62; Fourth Report 307-10.
96. Rule 1.1 of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure provides that they shall not
be applicable "where the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute." Third Report
153.
97. Third Report 154-62; Fourth Report 307-10. Hereafter the proposed rules con-
tained in the title 27 shall be referred to as renumbered in the Fourth Report.
98. Rule 27.2. But cf. Proposed Rule 31.3 which allows plaintiff to serve with the
summons in an action a notice of motion for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint.
First Report 91.
99. Rule 27.2(a).
100. Rule 27.2(b).
101. Rule 27.2(c).
102. Rule 26.2, First Report 60.
103. Rule 27.2(b).
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While pleadings are unnecesary in the many special proceedings which
are in reality nothing more than a motion, they serve a useful function in
those more elaborate special proceedings which involve a trial. Consequently,
aside from time provisions, 0 4 it was decided to apply the general rules of
pleading to special proceedings. 10 5 But, where no trial is necessary, summary
disposition on the papers may be had without a separate motion for summary
judgment. 06 To make such disposition possible, affidavits and other papers
may be served with the pleadings 0 7 and a reply is permitted without court
order.10
All papers which have been served are submitted to the court for the
hearing.'0 9 As far as possible, the court makes a summary determination
upon the papers," 0 and if issues of fact are raised, sets a date for trial."'
Without the necessity of queuing up on the regular action calendar, it is
contemplated that even jury trials could be had at an early date. The
special proceeding terminates in a judgment instead of, as is now the practice,
in a final order." 2 Since both a final order and a judgment serve the same
function,' no reason is seen for different terminology or for different appeal
and enforcement procedure." 3
From the above summary, it can be seen that the differences in the
proposed procedure of a special proceeding from that of an action are few.
In most cases, a special proceeding will be conducted largely in the same
manner as an action. There will be occasions, however, when there is no
Title 27 rule applicable and the procedure of an action would be inappropriate
because of the circumstances of the particular case. In order to preserve the
summary nature and flexibility of the special proceeding on such occasions,
Title 27 gives the court a good deal more control over the litigation than it
has in an action.
In an action, for example, it is generally considered good practice to
permit all claims of all parties to be adjudicated in the same litigation, and
to permit parties to be added freely without court order. But such additional
parties and claims may considerably delay the disposition of the main claim.
Consequently, under Title 27, leave of court is required for joinder or inter-
pleader after the proceeding is commenced and for all third party practice
104. The answer in a special proceeding must be served at least one day before the
petition is noticed to be heard, and any reply at least on that date. Rule 27.2(b).
105. Cf. rules 27.3, rules 27.4, 27.5, rule 27.7. For the same reason it was decided to
provide for motions directed to the pleadings. Such motions are returnable on the hearing
date.
106. Rule 27.2(b).
107. Rule 27.2(b).
108. Rule 27.3. The proposed rules would allow a reply in an action only upon
court order, except where there is a counterclaim. Rule 26.1, First Report 59.
109. Rule 27.9(a).
110. Rule 27.9(b).
111. Rule 27.10.
112. Rule 27.11.
113. See note 93, supra.
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and intervention.1 14 In addition the court at any time may order a severance
of a claim, counterclaim or crossclaim or as to a particular party."15
The provisions for service of a summons in an action, which are generally
applicable to service of a notice of petition, are designed to give the adversary
adequate notice of the action. But in a particular special proceeding a
different notice may be both adequate and necessary. Thus, Title 27 authorizes
the court to permit service of an order to show cause in lieu of a notice of
petition at a time and in a manner specified therein."16
Another instance of court control provided for by Title 27 is the restric-
tion of the free disclosure which, under the proposed practice, would be
available in an action without court order." 7 Such disclosure often is un-
necessary in a special proceeding and can seriously interfere with its summary
prosecution. Therefore, it is provided that disclosure in a special proceeding
may be obtained only by leave of court."18 Finally, in order to increase the
possibility of summary determination, something of the continental principle
of judicial investigation" 9 has been introduced into our practice by permitting
the court to require the parties to submit additional proof at the hearing. 20
Since the many separate statutes providing for procedure in special
proceedings would remain in effect, the initial impact of the proposed uniform
procedure would be only interstitial. Even so, it immediately would solve a
major problem of present practice by filling the considerable procedural gaps
left by these statutes. In the future, the effect of the proposed procedure could
be considerably expanded, by amending these statutes to conform to it. Because
of the flexibility of its application, the uniform procedure also can serve as a
valuable device for future procedural reform. Without altering the rules
themselves, the legislature, or the court in the exercise of its rule-making
function, could expand their applicability to any number of new remedies
simply by cross-reference.
A uniform mode of summary procedure is not altogether unprecedented
in American practice. A few states have experimented with it. 121  The
Virginia notice of motion for judgment form of procedure, for example, was
instituted in 1849 to afford a speedy remedy for the collection of liquidated
sums on a contract.' 22 It employed simple motion-type procedure and became
so popular that its applicability was continuously expanded until it recently
114. Rule 27.1.
115. Rule 27.6.
116. Rule 27.2(d).
117. See Title 34, First Report 114-60.
118. Rule 27.8.
119. See Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, 18 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1923).
120. Rule 27.9(a).
121. See McMahon, Summary Procedure: A Comparative Study, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 573
(1957); Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 Yale L.J. 193
(1928).
122. It had been used even earlier, beginning in 1732 as a summary means to recover
money from a public officer. Millar, supra note 121, at 213.
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completely superseded the "ordinary" form of procedure.12 3 But, in addition
to this summary procedure, Virginia has maintained the usual multitude of
special proceedings provided for by statute scattered throughout its substan-
tive code.124
A more recent example of the use of a uniform summary procedure,
which continues to retain its vitality, is New Jersey's action "on order to
show cause in lieu of summons.' 25  It also employs procedure similar to
that on a motion and must be used in all "actions where the court is permitted
to proceed in a summary manner" or where a rule specifically makes the
procedure applicable.126
Such experiments with a unitary treatment of special proceedings,
however, have been rare. In most of our states and in the federal practice
the need for a summary procedure has been filled piecemeal as it was
recognized with regard to particular remedies. This fragmentary approach
has continued to the present day, apparently unaffected by the spirit of
uniformity which has swept the country since the advent of code reform.
V. CONCLUSION
The traditional American approach to special proceedings has given
rise to difficulties very much like those that resulted from the common law
approach to actions. New York's problems of definition and of ascertaining
the applicable procedure are typical. The special proceeding, provided for
in a variety of forms by a multitude of separate statutes is now as ripe for
unitary treatment as was the many-formed action in 1848.
Applicability of the general practice provisions and a uniform mode of
procedure are proposed as the first steps in a reform which would abolish the
forms of special proceedings in the same way that the Field Code abolished the
forms of action. The extent to which this goal can be achieved in New York
depends on what eventually is done with the separate statutory provisions
which now govern particular special proceedings. In the meantime, the pro-
posals should solve many of the more immediate problems engendered by the
present system and provide a readily available means for complete reform.
123. Under the new rules, however, it appears to have lost much of its summary
character and become the equivalent of a code action. See Va. Rules of the Sup. Ct.
of Appeals 3.1-3.20; Burks, Common Law and Statutory Pleading and Practice 289-308
(4th ed. 1952). For the practice before the rules, see Burks, Pleading and Practice in
Actions at Common Law 272-320 (3d ed. 1934); Fowler, Virginia Notice of Motion
Procedure, 24 Va. L. Rev. 711 (1938); see also Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99 (1936)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Virginia procedure and authorizing its use by
federal trial courts under the Conformity Act).
124. See Denman, supra note 89.
125. "N.J.R. Civ. P. 4:85.
126. N.J.R. Civ. P. 4:85. The application of the rule has been strictly confined to
cases where the authority of statute or rule is expressed. See Matter of Aronowitz v.
Reyville Textile Corp., 21 N.J. Super. 234, 91 A.2d 103 (App. Div. 1952); O'Brien v.
Baldwin, 2 NJ. Super. 134, 65 A.2d 65 (App. Div. 1949).
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